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Marc v a n  d e r  P o e l
ERASMUS, RHETORIC AND THEOLOGY: 
THE ENCOMIUM MATRIMONII1
1. Introduction
The following study extends an argument on the humanist declama­
tion that I first made in my 1987 doctoral dissertation.2 In my disserta­
tion I concluded that the interest of the early sixteenth-century humanists 
in declamation, and specially in the rhetorical treatment of the thesis, 
must be understood in light of their view that rhetoric, if taught follow­
ing their method, can provide a substantial contribution to moral educa­
tion. In this article I shall exemplify this conclusion by means of some 
observations on Erasmus’s Encomium matrimonii, a model letter of per­
suasion which forms part of De conscribendis epistolis. After a brief 
introduction in which Erasmus’s concern for the thesis in declamations 
is briefly established, the Encomium matrimonii will be analyzed in light 
of the rules for deliberative oratory, as described in Quintilian’s 
Institutio oratoria, 3, 8. Next, the polemic surrounding the Encomium 
matrimonii will be focused on briefly. More specifically, I will examine 
how Erasmus, in his three apologies of the Encomium matrimonii, 
appeals to the rhetorical status of the Encomium matrimonii to defend 
himself against allegations of heresy formulated by his opponents.
2. Erasmus and Classical Rhetoric
Erasmus valued rhetoric not only as a linguistic, dialectical and styl­
istic guide by means of which the quality of Latin writing could be
1 This study was made possible by a grant from the Dutch Royal Academy of 
Sciences and is based on a paper presented at the 10th biennial conference of the 
International Society for the History of Rhetoric (Edinburgh, July 18-22, 1995). I thank 
Dr. P. Tuynman (Amsterdam) for his useful remarks and Professor K. Lloyd-Jones 
(Trinity College, Hartford, Connecticut) for help with my English.
2 M. van der Poel, De declamatio bij de humanisten. Bijdrage tot de studie van defunc- 
ties van de rhetorica in de Renaissance. With an English Summary (Nieuwkoop, 1987).
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improved, but also as a curriculum offering both a complete intellectual 
training and a moral education. This approach to rhetoric was inspired 
by the ancient ideology commonly referred to through Cato the Elder’s 
motto orator est vir bonus dicendi peritus. Among the ancient theorists 
who were influential in later times, Quintilian was its most enthusiastic 
defender. In his Institutio Oratoria, he strongly opposed the theory, 
defended by other ancient authors, that rhetoric is merely a technique 
of persuasive discourse, devoid of value judgements. According to 
Quintilian, a public speaker is not an orator, unless he is an honorable 
man who places himself at the service of the moral improvement of 
society. Quintilian believed that the precepts of decent and honest liv­
ing (‘ratio rectae honestaeque vitae’) belong not only to the field of 
philosophy, but also to that of eloquence.3 Together with the actual cur­
riculum described in the Institutio oratoria, Erasmus adopted 
Quintilian’s philosophy of rhetoric, as becomes evident in the Ratio 
studii (1511), the trivium curriculum designed for John Colet’s school 
at St. Paul’s cathedral in London.4 Moreover, the notion of the orator as 
an educator in private and public morality forms the background 
against which Erasmus’s well-known declamations, such as the 
Encomium moriae (1511) or the Querela pads  (1517) must be under­
stood.
Among the instruments by means of which the ancient orator could 
provide his speech with the desired moral content, the thesis figures 
prominently. The thesis or general question (quaestio infinita, con- 
sultatio or propositum) belongs originally to philosophy and treats 
subjects from a general, abstract perspective. The Greek rhetor 
Hermagoras (second century B.C.) had introduced the thesis into 
rhetoric, distinguishing it from the concrete question {quaestio finita or 
causa), which is defined by the actual circumstantiae of life, and which 
in other words concerns concrete facts and persons in the context of
3 Inst., 1, praefatio 10. On the moral quality of rhetoric see e.g. Inst., 1, praefatio 9- 
20; 2, 15 (‘what is rhetoric?’); 2, 20 (‘is rhetoric free of values?’); 12, 1 (‘a great orator 
must be a good man’). See for Quintilian’s view on rhetoric and moral philosophy in the 
context of other ancient views on this matter specially M. Winterbottom, ‘Quintilian and 
the ‘vir bonus” , The Journal o f Roman Studies, 54 (1964), 90-91.
4 Erasmus indicated his admiration for Quintilian’s pedagogy, among other places, in 
the following passage of De ratione studii·. “Sed video te cupere vt de docendi quoque 
ratione nonnihil attingamus. Age mos geratur Viterio, quanquam video Fabium hisce de 
rebus diligentissime praecepisse, adeo vt post hunc de iisdem scribere impudentissimum 
esse videatur” (Opera omnia, vol. I, 2, ed. J.-Cl. Margolin, Amsterdam, 1971 [henceforth 
referred to as ASD I, 2], p. 119, lines 14-17).
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place and time.5 According to Quintilian, the discussion of general 
questions also belongs to the field of the orator because only then can 
every concrete question be discussed completely, when the underlying 
general question is also taken into consideration. Thus, Cato can only 
answer the question whether he himself should marry, when he has first 
made up his mind about the value of marriage in general.6 In order to 
stress the importance of the thesis, Quintilian also refers to Cicero 
('Orator 45, De oratore 3, 120 and Topica 21), who emphasizes the 
importance of discussing the particular matter at hand in light of the 
underlying, general question, so as to provide the audience with the 
necessary information to make a respectable and fair judgement.7 
Quintilian stresses how useful it is for the orator to declaim theses,8 and 
he points out that some theses can be turned into concrete questions in 
the deliberative field simply by putting them into the mouths of spe­
cific persons.9
In the rhetorical theory and practice of Erasmus the thesis likewise 
plays an important role. Thus, in De ratione studii (1511), all the themes 
which Erasmus proposes for suasoriae (that is, declamations in the 
deliberative field) are theses, some of which deal with philosophical 
issues which have been debated since olden days, while others deal with 
problems belonging to Erasmus’s own times: ‘from the outset the best 
things should be learned,’ ‘happiness does not consist in wealth,’ ‘a 
mother should nourish her offspring with her own milk,’ ‘Greek should 
or should not be learned,’ ‘a man should or should not marry,’ ‘one
5 H. Throm, Die Thesis. Ein Beitrag zu ihrer Entstehung und Geschichte (Paderbom, 
1932), pp. 80-159; S.F. Bonner, Roman Declamation in the Late Republic and Early 
Empire (Liverpool, 1949), pp. 2-11; D. Matthes, ‘Hermagoras von Temnos 1904-1955’, 
Lustrum, 3 (1958), 121-132. The distinction between quaestio finita  and quaestio infinita 
forms, since the time of Hermagoras, a standard part of rhetorical theory (see, e.g., 
Quintilian, Inst., 3, 5, 5).
6 Quintilian, Inst., 3, 5, 12-13.
7 Quintilian, Inst., 3, 5, 14-15. Quintilian also mentions that Cicero, in his youthful 
work De inventione, 1, 8, had criticized Hermagoras for distinguishing the cause from the 
general question, but that he later changed his mind completely. See for the thesis in 
Cicero’s orations A. Michel, Les rapports de la rhétorique et de la philosophie dans 
l ’oeuvre de Cicéron (Paris, 1960), specially pp. 201-219.
8 Inst., 2, 1 ,9 ; 2, 4, 24 (where he notes that Cicero included in the Pro Murena the 
thesis ‘who deserves the greatest praise, the lawyer or the soldier?’); 10, 5, 11; 12, 2 25. 
Compare Cicero, Att., 9, 4, and the theses in the Progymnasmata of Aphthonius (fourth- 
fifth century).
9 Inst., 2, 4, 25. He cites the examples of ‘whether marriage is desirable’ and ‘whether 
a public career should be the object of ambition.’
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should or should not go on pilgrimages.’10 In the 1490s, at a time when 
he worked as a teacher in the art of speech, Erasmus developed the tra­
ditional thesis for and against marriage into two (epistolae) suasoriae, 
and it is to these that we shall now turn our attention.
3. Erasmus’s Suasoriae for and against Marriage
The epistulae suasoriae for and against marriage were written in the 
course of the 1490s and form part of De conscribendis epistolis.11 They 
are included both in the 1521 unauthorized edition of De conscribendis 
epistolis, printed in Cambridge, for which a manuscript circulating in 
England from the 1490s was used,12 and in the authorized 1522 edition 
published in Basel in 1522.13 From 1518 onward, the epistola suasoria 
in favor of marriage also has a long printing history as a separate decla-
10 “Aliquando ceu declamatorium thema dabit in diuersis generibus, puta (...) statim 
optima discenda. In opibus non esse foelicitatem. Matrem proprio lacte nutrire debere 
quod peperit. Literis graecis non esse dandam, aut esse dandam operam. Vxorem esse 
ducendam, aut non esse ducendam. Peregrinandum esse, aut non esse peregrinandum, in 
genere suasorio” (ASD I, 2, p. 133). It will be noticed that in antiquity, these topics do 
not fall into the field of deliberative oratory in the strict political sense of the word. 
Quintilian, Inst., 3, 8, 14-15, however, already observed that the deliberative field com­
prehends more than issues regarding the polis strictly; the humanists, to all intents and 
purposes, included all things about which it is possible to deliberate under the heading of 
deliberative oratory; see M. van der Poel, ‘Observations on J.L. Vives’ Theory of 
Deliberative Oratory in “De Consultatione” (1523)’, in: A. Dalzell - Ch. Fantazzi - R. 
Schoeck (eds.), Acta o f the Seventh International Congress o f the International 
Association for Neo-Latin Studies, Toronto, Canada, 8-13 August 1988 (Binghamton, 
NY, 1991), pp. 803-810. See for the importance of the thesis within the rhetorical writ­
ings of Erasmus: P. Tuynman, ‘Erasmus: functionele rhetorica bij een christen-ciceroni- 
aan’, Lampas, 9 (1976), 163-195.
11 Erasmus affirms that they form part of De conscribendis epistolis in the Apologia 
pro declamatione matrimonii of 1519 (LB IX, 108 C) and in the Catalogus lucubra- 
tionum of 1523 (Allen, letter 1, p. 18, 1. 7-10; vol. 1, p. 18). In this passage of the 
Catalogus lucubrationum and in the Dilutio of 1532 (see note 28 below for the full title 
of this writing; ed. Telle, p. 70) Erasmus mentions that he wrote the suasoriae for and 
against marriage for his student William Blount, Lord Mountjoy, to whom Erasmus 
taught rhetoric in the late 1490s. See on the date and the addressee also Allen, letter 604, 
note at line 10 (vol. 3, p. 17).
12 Erasmus mentions this manuscript, of which he still had a copy in 1526, in the 
Appendix de scriptis Jodoci Clithovei (LB IX, 813 B). I have been unable to consult the 
1521 edition; Margolin records that it contains both the pro and con part (Erasmus, 
Opera omnia, vol. I, 5, Amsterdam, 1975 [henceforth referred to as ASD I, 5], p. 339, 
note 22).
13 ASD I, 2, p. 400-429 (the letter in favor of marriage), p. 429-432 (outline of the let­
ter against marriage).
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mation. In the first two of the separate editions, it was called Declamatio 
in genere suasorio de laude matrimonii. From the third separate edition 
onward it was simply called Encomium matrimonii;14 we shall hence­
forth refer to it by this title.
Notwithstanding the fact that these suasoriae treat a commonplace 
topic, they do not merely contain a rehearsel of standard arguments. To 
the contrary, they offer a two-sided, dialectical discussion of marriage, 
in which Erasmus presents a quite innovative view of marriage. He 
defends the view that celibacy, as distinguished from complete absti­
nence, is not by definition and under every circumstance morally supe­
rior to marriage, and that this even applies to clerical and monastic 
celibacy. In other words, he defends the view that marriage is, as such, 
just as worthy as clerical and monastic celibacy, and that it depends on 
the psychological and external circumstances of the individual as to 
whether celibacy is the better choice or vice versa. This view is 
explained through two opposite themes which explore under which cir­
cumstances marriage can be preferable to clerical and monastic celibacy 
or vice versa. As is fitting for declamations, the circumstantial details of 
each theme are completely fictional, but, as we shall see, they are true to 
life and they have been invented in such a way that the reader can easily 
understand how each theme has affinity with reality. Throughout the dis­
cussion of each theme, general observations play a very important role; 
that is to say, the quaestio finita is worked out in light of a detailed dis­
cussion of the underlying quaestio infinita or thesis. Let us now consider 
both sides of the issue as Erasmus presents them.
In the case against marriage, Erasmus introduces a boy named Peter, 
who is completely devoted to his intellectual pursuits. Yet his mother 
forces him to quit school and implores him to marry, against his wishes, 
a certain rich and beautiful girl. Peter’s father does not stand against 
either his wife or his son, and allows his son to make his own choice.15 
In this case, it is evident that, if the boy were to choose in favor of mar­
riage, he would make this decision on the basis of unsuitable arguments,
14 The first edition was printed in Louvain, March 30, 1518; the third edition was 
printed in Basel, August 30, 1518; there are eleven separate editions dating from 
Erasmus’s lifetime, plus translations into French, German and English (see Bibliotheca 
Belgica, vol. 2, p. 767-774). Modem edition in ASD I, 5, p. 385-416.
15 ASD I, 2, p. 429, line 25-430, line 5. Erasmus discusses first the causa for marriage 
and then the causa against marriage; this order of presentation is inverted here for the 
sake of convenience.
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namely against his own will and psychological disposition, and merely 
out of compliance with his mother’s wish. Therefore, it is obvious that a 
letter of dissuasion must be written. In De conscribendis epistolis, being 
a manual for Latin writing, Erasmus only presents fully elaborated 
examples of a few kinds of letters, but mostly confines himself to sug­
gesting relevant arguments or to giving indications about the way to 
compose, by way of exercise, a particular kind of letter. This is also the 
way he now proceeds in the case of the letter of dissuasion.16 More 
specifically, he provides a detailed survey of standard arguments against 
marriage (marriage leads to servitude, marriage gives rise to lascivious­
ness, the standard misogynic ideas found in writers like Juvenal and the 
Church Fathers, the disadvantages inherent even to good marriages, such 
as lack of time to devote oneself to intellectual pursuits, etc.).17
In the case in favor of marriage, Erasmus introduces a young man of 
noble birth, who is the only son and heir; this implies that the hope of 
prolonging his lineage depends on him alone. The young man is deter­
mined to remain celibate, although he has an affectionate relationship 
with a rich young woman of noble descent, who unites beauty with hon­
esty and loves him greatly; the young man also disregards the advice of 
all his friends, who strongly recommend him to get married. The motive 
for the young man’s reluctance to get married is twofold: first, grief 
caused by his mother’s recent death, and secondly, as Erasmus puts it, 
religious scruples (‘religio’).18 Here, the circumstantial details are cho­
sen in such a way that the young man’s decision in favor of clerical 
celibacy appears to be wrong for three reasons. First, he does not have a 
true spiritual vocation; secondly, he ignores the love which exists 
between himself and the young woman; and thirdly, he neglects his 
duties toward his family. Thus, this case constitutes a strong argument in 
favor of marriage.
Erasmus developed this recommendation into a full deliberative 
address, discussing the fictional case in light of the problems which 
existed concerning marriage in his own time, and against the background
16 In the 1519 Apologia pro declamatione matrimonii, Erasmus observes that he did 
not elaborate the opinion against marriage into a full discourse, because it had already 
been dealt with by so many authors before him (LB IX, 108 C).
17 ASD, I, 2, p. 430, 1. 4 - p. 432, 1. 14. The second part of De copia contains, from 
the 1514 edition onward, also a brief discussion of possible arguments against marriage 
(ASD I, 6, ed. B. Knott, p. 224-225).
18 ASD I, 2, p. 401, lines 7-18; ASD I, 5, p. 385, line 13 - p. 386, line 23.
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of the general aspects concerning marriage which are relevant to every 
person, living at any time and at any place, who deliberates whether to 
get married or stay single. Because he wrote his Encomium matrimonii 
for didactic purposes as a model letter, it is to be expected that he made 
an effort to follow closely the classical rules. To see this, it is useful to 
read the text in light of the rules for deliberative oratory provided by 
Erasmus’s master Quintilian {Inst., 3, 8). The subsequent observations 
on the loci argumentorum (the grounds for arguments or topics) suggest 
that he did indeed follow Quintilian. My observations on Erasmus’s han­
dling of the topics suggest moreover that some of Quintilian’s remarks 
on deliberative oratory are useful for interpreting the tenor of the 
Encomium matrimonii.
In the section on deliberative oratory, Quintilian offers, among other 
things, detailed observations on the topics. He considers utile and hon­
estum the most important points of view, and he examines them at great 
length (3, 8, 1-3; 30-35; 35-47). He also discusses necessitas, only to 
reject the view of those theorists who introduced necessitas as an inde­
pendent topic (3, 8, 25-28). In this context, he also mentions that some 
theorists defined many other topics, such as fas, iustum, facile, iucundum 
and their counterparts (3, 8, 26-28). According to Quintilian, these top­
ics do not merit separate treatment, because they constitute subdivisions 
of either honestum or utile. However, he does discuss briefly iucundum, 
because some theorists consider it in some deliberations as the only rel­
evant topic (3, 8, 28-29).
In the Encomium matrimonii, Erasmus uses precisely the four topics, 
which Quintilian particularly discussed in 3, 8, namely honestum, iucun­
dum, utile and necessarium', these last two, as we shall see, are in fact 
combined to form one topic. Erasmus enumerates these topics, using 
the term rationes (reasons, grounds for arguments), in the introduction 
of the Encomium, where they function as the divisio in classical speech, 
immediately after the description of the causa.19 He then proceeds to the
19 ASD I, 2, p. 401, line 19-402, line 2. I shall only refer to the edition in De con­
scribendis epistolis (ASD I, 2, p. 401, line 19 - p. 428, line 24). The text is largely the 
same in the De conscribendis epistolis version and in the separate version (ASD I, 5, p. 
385-416). The following three passages from the 1522 edition of De conscribendis epis­
tolis are lacking in the separate edition: 1. a short but very critical passage on the practise 
of priests living with concubines, included in the examination of Christ’s praise of those 
who live chastily (ASD I, 2, p. 418, lines 3-10; cp. ASD I, 5, p. 404, note at lines 225- 
226); 2. a passage on the levirate, included at the end of the discussion of the topic ho­
nestum (ASD I, 2, p. 419, line 20 - p. 420, line 15; cp. ASD I, 5, p. 407, note at 1. 249);
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confirmatio, which consists of three parts, corresponding to the topics or 
rationes, as enumerated in the introduction, that is honestum, iucundum 
and utile-necessarium. Let us briefly discuss each part.20
Honestum
Some ancient rhetors taught that utile is the main topic relevant to 
deliberative oratory. Quintilian criticizes this view, and states that if he 
had to choose one specific topic, he would, like Cicero, not choose use­
fulness, but dignity (dignitas; honestum).21 Erasmus, in his turn, follows 
Cicero and Quintilian, and uses honestum as the first and hence most 
important argument. His discussion of this argument moreover consti­
tutes the longest part of the Encomium matrimonii (p. 402, line 3 - p. 
420, line 19).
In this part, Erasmus mainly presents general considerations; in other 
words, this part is almost entirely situated on the level of the thesis or 
generalis quaestio. In order to argue that marriage is honorable in itself, 
Erasmus offers a wide range of considerations, which are ordered under 
three headings: marriage as a divine law, a human law, and a law of 
nature.22
1. Marriage, so Erasmus begins his advice to the young man, was not 
instituted by human law, but by divine law (p. 402, line 3 - p. 406, line 
10). At Creation, God gave Eve to Adam as a companion, and created
3. a passage on second marriages, in which the second marriage of Thomas More is men­
tioned, included at the end of the discussion of the topic iucundum (ASD I, 2, p. 425, lines 
9-16). A number of small additions were moreover included in later editions of De con­
scribendis epistolis, one in the Paris edition of 1527 (see critical apparatus in ASD I, 2, p. 
407), and several in the Basel edition of 1534 (see critical apparatus in ASD I, 2, p. 403, 
406, 410, 411, 414, 418, 426, 428).
20 An entirely different analysis of the Encomium matrimonii was proposed by E.V. 
Telle, Erasme de Rotterdam et le septième sacrement (Geneva, 1954), pp. 160-176. 
Telle’s analysis presupposes the view that the Encomium matrimonii is not a piece of 
deliberative oratory, but a work on doctrine that contains an (albeit veiled) attack on 
monasticism. Telle’s notes on the Dilutio (see note 28 for the full title of this writing) also 
presuppose this view and likewise amount to a polemical attack against Erasmus’s sin­
cerity and his allegedly heretical views. J. Chomarat, Grammaire et rhétorique chez 
Erasme (Paris, 1981), vol. 2, pp. 949-952, presents a short but useful analysis of the 
Encomium matrimonii to show that it does indeed follow the classical rules of delibera­
tive oratory. Compare also the remarks on the Encomium matrimonii in J. B. Payne, 
Erasmus. His Theology o f the Sacraments (Atlanta, 1970), pp. 109-111.
21 Quintilian, Inst., 3, 8, 1. He refers to Cicero, De oratore, 2, 334.
22 Some of the arguments discussed under these headings are in fact rather traditional, 
as Payne shows {Erasmus, p. 280, note 26).
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her from Adam’s rib to make us understand that nothing should be 
dearer, closer and more indissolubly attached to man than his wife 
(Genesis 1, 28). After the Flood, God gave as his first commandment to 
the race of mortals that it should increase and multiply, and thus ordered 
by implication that man and woman should be joined in matrimony 
(Genesis 9, 1). This view is supported by the New Testament, since 
Christ referred to the law that man should leave his family and join his 
wife (Matthew 19, 5 and Mark 10, 7). Erasmus also stresses that mar­
riage was instituted before the Fall, in order to contribute to man’s hap­
piness, not as a remedy for sin, and he mentions that the Bible confirms 
the divinity of marriage by means of example, when Christ attended the 
wedding at Cana and honored it by performing his first miracle there 
(John 2, 1). Erasmus then discusses several objections based on 
Scripture, which he refutes one by one. First, he refutes the counter­
arguments that Christ himself did not marry (we must not follow Christ 
in everything, he says, because He is a supernatural being) and that 
Christ was bom from a virgin (Erasmus acknowledges the validity of 
this point, but argues that the Blessed Virgin was nonetheless married, 
thus showing us the way to follow; Joseph is mentioned as an example 
that stimulates men to live virtuously in the nuptial bond). Next, 
Erasmus observes that the Gospel never mentions celibacy in the normal 
civil sense of not being married, in which he himself uses the term, but 
extols the nobility of marriage (e.g., Ephesians 5, 32 and Hebrews 13, 
4); he also mentions that the Old Testament actually condemns childless 
marriages (e.g. Psalm 127, 3), and therefore a fortiori celibacy.
2. Under the second heading, human law (p. 406, line 11 - p. 409, 
line 2), Erasmus argues that, from olden days and in various cultures, 
marriage has always been a highly honored institution. As examples, he 
mentions relevant evidence from Jewish law, Roman law and Spartan 
law (Lycurgus). An argument ex contrario is also presented: Jewish, 
Roman and Spartan legislators took firm action against adultery.
3. Under the third heading, the law of nature (p. 409, line 3 - p. 420, 
line 19), Erasmus advises against the extremely negative attitude toward 
sexuality, which constitutes one of the main reasons why the young man 
described in the introduction (thema) of the Encomium matrimonii does 
not want to marry. In this section, which is the longest of the three sec­
tions dealing with honestum, Erasmus opposes the negative attitude of 
contemporary clerics toward marriage. He starts his discussion by saying 
that the desire to get married (i.e. to search for a mate) is a universal
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desire, among both human beings and animals (and even among trees 
and magnetic stones, which are also identified according to masculine 
and feminine gender). To illustrate this claim, he draws a few examples 
from Pliny the Elder and from mythological tales; he also observes that 
even among the most barbarian nations marriage was sacrosanct, and he 
mentions the example of wise men who were married (Abraham, Jacob, 
Solomon, Socrates).
He then starts his discussion of relevant Biblical testimonies. First, he 
states that sexuality cannot be sinful, because marriage was instituted 
prior to the Fall, and because human beings share their sexual urge with 
animals, that is, with creatures who have no free will and therefore are 
without sin (p. 414, line 11 - p. 415, line 3). Next, he refutes the young 
man’s objection that one should follow the rule of virtue, not of nature. 
To this objection Erasmus answers that the virtuous life must never go 
against nature, since virtue offers the perfection of nature. More specifi­
cally, he points out that the young man, who as a layman does not have 
the mission to teach the people, is not required to imitate the life of the 
apostles (p. 415, line 3 - p. 416, line 5). Finally, he refutes the young 
man’s objection that Christ Himself praised those who have embraced 
chastity and renounced marriage for the sake of the kingdom of heaven 
(‘sese castrarunt’; Matthew 19, 12). Erasmus accepts the authority of 
this statement, but interprets it in its historical context. He explains that 
Christ’s words apply to the time when it was proper that preachers, who 
needed to travel and who risked persecution, were completely free of all 
wordly duties. Nowadays, however, it is among married people that one 
is likely to find the least spoiled purity of morals. Moreover, scriptural 
praise of chastity does not only apply to those who abstain from mar­
riage, but also to those who live purely and chastily within marriage; 
nowhere does Christ lay an obligation on Christians to remain celibate, 
and He condemns divorce in strong terms. In the context of these 
Biblical observations, Erasmus formulates harsh criticism of those cler­
ics who, under the pretence of living chastely as celibates, indulge in 
lust, he exalts marriage, purely and chastely observed, as the most 
devout way of life, and he even suggests that in certain circumstances it 
would be morally preferable to give unchaste priests and monks the right 
to marry (p. 416, line 5 - p. 418, line 10).
In conclusion, Erasmus discusses the young man’s objection that 
chastity and marriage are incompatible because chastity is divine while 
marriage is human. He counters this objection by observing that virgin­
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ity is a praiseworthy thing, but not if all men practise it, and specifically 
in the case of the young man addressed in this model letter, chastity is 
even bad, because he will be responsible for the extinction of his noble 
lineage if he does not get married. In this context, Erasmus also dis­
cusses the argument against marriage which can be drawn from the high 
praise for virginity formulated by the Church Fathers. Erasmus observes 
that their enthusiasm for virginity was functional in their time. In the 
present time, he continues, the ethical standards of Christian society 
would be better served if those who unconditionally promote celibacy 
were to acknowledge the practical and moral value of matrimony (p. 
418, line 11 - p. 520, line 15).
Iucundum *
After a brief review of the arguments presented under the heading 
honestum (p. 420, lines 15-19), Erasmus goes on to discuss the second 
main point, namely iucundum (p. 420, line 19 -p. 425, line 16). At first 
sight, this part seems less significant than the first, because it no longer 
focuses on Biblical exegesis. Erasmus presents a rose-tinted picture of 
the daily existence of a married couple and their children living happily 
in mutual trust and harmony. Opposing the general negative attitude 
toward women, he stresses the special character of the nuptial bond 
which unconditionally unites, both spiritually and materially, husband 
and wife. Whoever disapproves of the physical and psychological joys 
generated by this bond, Erasmus argues, is hard-hearted and stupid. He 
also refutes three objections of the young man. In response to the first, 
arising from misogyny, that some wives are bad, he eloquently states 
that bad wives are not bom but made by the bad behavior of their hus­
bands: “Crede mihi, non solet nisi malis maritis mala uxor contingere” 
(p. 423, lines 11-12). He next observes that all the examples of bad mar­
riages from history and mythology can be countered with examples of 
good marriages; several examples are enumerated. Finally, to the objec­
tion that marriage destroys the freedom of the individual, he observes 
that in a good marriage the individual feels himself entirely free, that 
celibacy has its drawbacks too, and that the existence of second mar­
riages constitutes the proof that marriage is a thing to be desired.
If we assume that Erasmus uses rhetoric mostly for moral purposes, it 
perhaps seems rather surprising that he makes iucundum into one of the 
main parts of his letter, comprising both arguments and the refutation of
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objections. Thus, it would have been possible and sensible to simply 
include a remark about the joys of a good marriage in the section on 
marriage as a law of nature. By such an approach Erasmus would have 
at least reduced the danger of giving the impression of favoring sexual 
pleasure. (The theologian Clichtove indeed felt that the Encomium mat­
rimonii smacked of illicit love and he compared it with books he con­
sidered lascivious, namely Poggio’s Facetiae and Valla’s De volup­
tateP )  The fact is, however, that Erasmus introduces an important moral 
lesson into his discussion of the topic iucundum, namely the husband’s 
responsibility to treat his wife decently. Moreover, it was necessary to 
treat this topic in the given fictitious circumstances of the theme in order 
to counteract the young man’s aversion to marriage, which to a large 
extent causes his ill-advised intention to abstain from marriage. Finally, 
the topic iucundum merits a prominent place in the Encomium matri­
monii because it figures among the standard topics in deliberative ora­
tory as described by Quintilian.
In this context, it is important to realize that Erasmus seems to follow 
closely Quintilian’s guidance concerning the topic iucundum. Quintilian 
disagrees with those theorists who claim that the question whether some­
thing is pleasant sometimes constitutes the only question of a delibera­
tion. He stresses that whenever the iucundum is relevant, it must come 
after the considerations based on honestum and/or utile {Inst., 3, 8, 28- 
29), and this is exactly how Erasmus uses the topic iucundum. In light of 
Quintilian’s rule, it thus seems that the position of iucundum in 
Erasmus’s letter mitigates its content to a certain extent: Erasmus does 
not maintain that marriage is pleasant, and therefore desirable, but that 
marriage is honorable, and in addition also pleasant, and hence desirable. 
This rhetorical subtlety was, of course, wasted on the theologians (as 
Clichtove’s above-mentioned reaction shows), but it must be taken into 
consideration if we wish to understand fully the view on marriage which 
Erasmus is expounding.
Utile', Necessarium
The two remaining topics are dealt with briefly in a single section (p. 
425, line 16 - p. 428, line 4). Erasmus points out that marriage is useful,
23 J. Clichtove, Propugnaculum ecclesiae, adversus Lvtheranos (Paris, 1526), fol. 
127r. In his Dilutio (see note 28 below for the full title), Erasmus justifiably complains 
that this comparison is absurd (ed. Telle, p. 96).
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because without it, the human race would perish;24 conversely, celibacy, 
defined here as an institution intended to give us an impression of life 
after death, is honorable for some individuals, but not for the average 
man and woman. In the particular case at hand, the young man (who, it 
must be remembered, has indeed at this very moment an affectionate 
relationship with a young woman) has a moral duty to marry, because 
without his offspring by honorable marriage, his noble line will die. Like 
the two previous ones, this section also has a separate refutatio in which 
the objections of the young man are countered. In response to the objec­
tion that the example of his sister, who became a nun, is an encourage­
ment to celibacy, Erasmus repeats the thought that he, as son and heir, 
has the moral duty to produce offspring, and therefore must necessarily 
get married, or, as Erasmus puts it, perform his duty as a human being 
which his sister does not wish to perform. After having made this point, 
Erasmus comes to the conclusion of the entire letter (p. 428, line 5 - p. 
428, line 24).
The treatment of the topics utile and necessarium calls for a few 
comments. As observed above, utile is, together with honestum, the 
main locus in Quintilian’s theory of deliberative oratory. Here, it 
occupies only a minor position and its content (‘marriage is useful, 
because without it, the human race would perish’) seems superfluous 
and rather naive. As to necessarium, we saw that Quintilian rejects 
the view that necessity can constitute the main argument in delibera­
tive oratory. He objects to this view, because deliberations, like all 
forms of oratory, deal with uncertain things (dubia; Inst., 3, 8, 25) 
and imply freedom of choice, while necessity excludes it. 
Nevertheless, Eramus uses this topic, albeit from only one specific 
point of view and in function of the circumstances inherent to this 
particular case at hand.
The minor position and weak content of the topic utile in Erasmus’s 
Encomium matrimonii help to underscore the importance of its tradi­
tional counterpart, the topic honestum. Moreover, the topic utile serves 
to meet a justifiable objection to the relevance of the topic necessarium. 
The observation drawn from the topic utile (‘marriage is useful, because 
without it, the human race would perish’) indeed constitutes only the 
introduction to the main point of the argument, which is drawn from the
24 In the altera pars, Erasmus eloquently counters this argument: “quasi vero desint 
qui isto munere (i.e. procreation) fungantur” (p. 432, lines 3-4).
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topic necessity: for this particular young man, who is son and heir, mar­
riage is not only useful, but necessary, because without his legal off­
spring his lineage will perish. The strategy which Erasmus follows here 
offers two advantages. First, it allows him to use in a meaningful way 
two standard topics which, in the case at hand, seem at first sight to fail 
to yield any arguments, or to offer only weak arguments. In particular, it 
is clear, as mentioned above, that the argument drawn from the topic 
utility seems unsubstantial by itself, but if it is considered in connection 
with the argument drawn from the topic necessity, it becomes meaning­
ful. It is also significant that the concept necessity is defined in terms of 
moral obligation.
Second and more importantly, Erasmus, by means of his handling of 
these two topics, carries his entire argument from the level of the gen­
eral question at which it has been mostly situated so far, definitively 
back to the level of the particular case at hand. Thus, he complies with 
one of the rules to which Quintilian attaches great importance, namely 
the rule that specially in deliberative oratory the orator must tailor his 
discourse to the psychological and material circumstances of those 
addressed (Inst. 3, 8, 15; 3, 8, 35-47). In the Encomium matrimonii, 
the argument develops slowly from the almost purely intellectual dis­
cussion of Christian marriage (the section honestum), via a brief sec­
tion in which general psychological and intellectual observations are 
combined to influence the feelings of the fictitious young man (the 
section iucundum), to a final section which focuses entirely on the per­
sonal circumstances of the young man (the section utile/necessarium). 
Placed as it is at the end of the letter, the moral and emotional appeal 
which is finally directed face-to-face to the addressee carries the entire 
weight of the preceding general, intellectual observations, and hence 
its effectiveness is guaranteed. Moreover, the final section of the 
Encomium matrimonii clearly repeats the moral lesson of the entire 
argument, which had already been formulated clearly in the part deal­
ing with honestum, namely that some people in the present day (‘hoc 
tempore’) need marriage, not clerical celibacy, in order to live as pious 
Christians.25
25 Compare Erasmus’s remarks in the 1519 Apologia pro declamatione matrimonii'. 
“Quid, quod hoc etiam tempore necessarium (sc. matrimonium)? Nemo tam superstitio- 
sus est, opinor, qui neget esse, quibus potius esse debeat matrimonium quam coelibatus” 
(LB IX, 108 F). Erasmus is thinking specifically about the evil of unchastity among cler­
ics and monks.
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4. The Reaction of the Theologians to the Encomium Matrimonii
In 1518, three years before the first publication of the Encomium mat­
rimonii and its counterpart, the dissuasion against marriage, in the 
Cambridge edition of De conscribendis epistolis, Erasmus published the 
Encomium matrimonii as a separate declamation in a small edition con­
taining four declamations.26 As a result of this publication, he fell into a 
polemic concerning his views on marriage and celibacy, first with the 
Louvain theologian Jan Briart of Ath, and later with the Paris theologian 
Josse Clichtove. These theologians considered the letter to be a hidden 
attack against clerical celibacy and monasticism, and hence accused 
Erasmus of spreading Lutheran ideas or at least of encouraging their dis­
semination; in plain words, they accused him of heresy. This contro­
versy gave the Encomium matrimonii a high degree of notoriety, and, 
during Erasmus’s lifetime, it went through a considerable number of 
publications and was translated into French, German and English.27
Between 1519 and 1532, Erasmus wrote three apologies to defend 
himself against the accusations of Briart and Clichtove.28 He also 
returned to the topic of marriage and celibacy in a number of other writ­
ings published after 1518, specially in the De institutione Christiani 
matrimonii of 1526.29 It is not relevant to our present purpose to study 
the theological content of the apologies against the background of the 
criticism of Briart and Clichtove and in light of Erasmus’s other theo­
26 See for bibliographical details, note 14 above.
27 See for bibliographical details, note 14 above.
28 The first apology, Apologia pro declamatione matrimonii, dated March 1, 1519, is 
a response to the verbal attacks of Briart, formulated in a speech delivered at a degree- 
granting ceremony. The Apologia was inserted in the Paraphrasis ad Corinthios then in 
press; see Allen, letter 916, introduction (vol. 3, p. 480); text in LB IX, 105 F-112 A. The 
second apology, Appendix de scriptis Jodoci Clithovei, is a brief response, written in 
haste in order to include it in a writing which was about to be published, to the attack 
which Josse Clichtove, in his Propugnaculum ecclesiae adversus Luther anos of 1526 (see 
above, note 23), had formulated against both the Encomium matrimonii and the 1519 
Apologia; the Appendix was inserted in the Prologus in supputationem calumniarum 
Bedae (Basel, 1526); see Allen, letter 1780, note at line 38 (vol. 6, p. 454); text in LB IX, 
811 F-814 D. The third apology constitutes a more detailed refutation of Clichtove’s 
attack (Dilutio eorum quae Iodocus Clithoveus scripsit adversus declamationem Des. 
Erasmi Roterodami suasoriam matrimonii (Antwerp and Basel, 1532); modera edition 
with notes by E. V. Telle (Paris, 1968)).
29 Also in Paraphrases in Ad Corinthios 1 ,7 ; in Matthaeum 19, 10 ff (1519); in sev­
eral passages from De interdicto esu carnium (1522), Comparatio virginis et martyri 
(1524), Vidua Christiana (1529), and finally in the colloquies Proci et puellae (1523), 
Virgo misogamos, Virgo poenitens, Coniugium (1523), Coniugium impar (1529).
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logical and literary writings concerning marriage and celibacy.30 But it is 
important to make a few observations on those passages from the apolo­
gies which deal with the rhetorical nature of declamations.
It is evident that Erasmus’s innovative and well-argued view that mar­
riage is intrinsically as honorable as celibacy, which underlies the 
Encomium matrimonii, was controversial and would have given rise to 
vigorous debate among contemporary theologians even if the Encomium 
matrimonii had been understood correctly. But in fact, Briart and 
Clichtove did not understand (or perhaps did not want to understand) its 
rhetorical purport correctly, and it is this rejection of rhetoric which gave 
rise to their excessive reaction. It is precisely this problem which 
Erasmus deals with at the beginning of each apology. The problem was 
that Briart and Clichtove neither understood nor accepted that the 
Encomium matrimonii is a suasoria, that is, a recommendation concern­
ing a concrete case addressed to a concrete person. In general, the the­
ologians of the period did not want to recognize that rhetoric had an 
independent role in its own right in the forming of public opinions on 
dubia (Quintilian, Inst., 3, 8, 25) and morality in everyday life, as I 
argue in my study Cornelius Agrippa, the Humanist Theologian and his 
Declamations.31 As a result, Briart and Clichtove did not see that 
Erasmus’s discussion of the general aspects concerning marriage (in 
other words, the discussion of the thesis) is not at all a statement claim­
ing absolute and universal validity, but a part that belongs naturally to 
the counsel. Hence the misunderstanding rose that the Encomium matri­
monii was written as an impartial treatment of marriage as such, and thus 
as an unconditional general praise of marriage to the detriment of 
celibacy in general and clerical and monastic celibacy in particular. 
Judged as a general praise such as a priest might give when preaching 
the doctrine, the Encomium matrimonii was considered by Briart and 
Clichtove to be heretical, because it opposed what they felt to be the 
definitive doctrine on marriage and celibacy, as defined by Scripture, the 
Church Fathers and the consensus within the Church.32
30 Two useful recent articles on Erasmus’s views on marriage are M. Heath, ‘Erasmus 
and the Laws of Marriage’, in R. Schnur (ed.), Acta Conventus Neo-Latini Hafniensis. 
Proceedings o f the Eighth International Congress o f Neo-Latin Studies (...) (Binghamton, 
NY, 1994), pp. 475-484, and A. W. Reese, ‘Learning Virginity: Erasmus’ Ideal of 
Christian Marriage’, Bibliothèque d ’Humanisme et Renaissance, 57 (1995), 551-567.
31 Brill’s Studies in Intellectual History, 77 (Leiden, 1997).
32 Before he wrote the Apologia pro declamatione matrimonii, Erasmus had already 
discussed the misunderstanding concerning the rhetorical nature of the Encomium matri-
ERASMUS’ ENCOMIUM MATRIMONII 223
In response to this attack, Erasmus stresses that the Encomium matri­
monii is not an authoritative theological statement concerning marriage, 
but a rhetorical discourse. In this context, two points in Erasmus’s 
defense deserve attention. Erasmus stresses first the dialectical nature of 
rhetoric, and secondly the liberties to which rhetoric can lay claim on 
account of its dialectical nature. The first point signifies that rhetoric, 
like dialectic, deals with the realm of probability, and hence can never 
aim to offer definitive answers in the form of authoritative statements; it 
necessarily only argues viewpoints on the basis of argumentation and 
refutation of counter-arguments.33 A suasoria moreover is not a general 
discourse, but offers concrete advice to a particular individual who seeks 
guidance tailored to his or her situation.34 Because declamations offer
monii with Briart in a private interview; see the Apologia adversus debacchationes Sutoris 
of 1527 (LB IX, 770 B) and Allen, introduction to letter 670 (vol. 3, p. 93). “Videtur 
autem pro materiae subiecte qualitate vocari potius debuisse: commendatio matrimonij, 
vel exhortatio ad matrimonium” (J. Clichtove, Propugnaculum ecclesiae adversus 
Lutheranos, Paris, 1526, fol. 128r). “Jodocus ita citat mea, quasi ego theologum agens serio 
suaserim illa populo Christiano” (Appendix de scriptis Jodoci Clithovei, LB IX, 813 A).
33 “Quis enim nescit, Declamationes exercitandi ingenii gratia in fictis thematis ver­
sari? (...) Tum harum hanc esse naturam, ut in utramque partem tractentur: veluti pro 
tyrannicida, contra tyrannicidam: pro raptore, contra raptorem: pro bello, contra bellum: 
pro Alexandro, contra Alexandrum: quod utrinque collatis propositionibus ac probation­
ibus, plurimum accedat judicio et inventioni, quae duae res ad eloquentiae facultatem 
valent plurimum” (Apologia pro declamatione matrimonii', LB IX, 108 A-B). “Novit (i.e. 
Clichtove) enim (...) quid sit declamatio, nimirum argumentum fictum, quod exercendae 
dictionis gratia tractatur in utramque partem” (Appendix de scriptis Jodoci Clithovei; LB 
IX, 812 F). Clichtove, who did indeed understand the dialectical nature of declamations, 
argued that declamations are usually confined to forensic issues, and therefore refused to 
see the Encomium matrimonii as a declamation (Propugnaculum ecclesiae adversus 
Lutheranos (Paris, 1526), fol. 127v-128r). In response, Erasmus argued that even if one 
calls the Encomium matrimonii a commendation of matrimony or an exhortation to mat­
rimony instead of a declamation, as Clichtove did, then it still is a classical suasoria, 
namely a counsel on a concrete subject for which it is possible to argue in utramque 
partem (Dilutio, ed. Telle, p. 71-73). See also, for the difference between ‘suasio’ and 
‘suadere’ on the one hand and ‘exhortatio’ or ‘commendatio’ on the other, Erasmus’s 
remarks from the second book of the Ecclesiastes'. ‘Quod Fabius suasorium (sc. genus) 
appellat, alii vocant deliberatiuum. Verum vbi nulla est ambiguitas, ibi nulla est delibera­
tio. Dubitari potest, an expediat coniugatos ad continentiae votum recipere virente eti- 
amnum aetate. At nemo deliberat an caste bonaque fide sit colendum matrimonium, hoc 
tamen suadetur vt, quod expetendum esse constat, alacrius expetatur. Ita venire potest in 
quaestionem an phas sit profiteri vitam monasticam, insciis aut inuitis etiam parentibus 
quibus liberorum officio sit opus, sed nullus ambigit quin liberi parentibus debeant hon­
orem et obedientiam. Quoties igitur suademus quae citra controuersiam pia sunt, exhorta­
mur verius quam suademus, nisi quod est quorundam tanta ruditas, vt de manifestis 
quoque dubitent (ASD V, 4, ed. J. Chomarat, p. 312, lines 581-591).
34 “Ne dicam interim, quod quaestionem tracto, non generalem, sed circumstan­
tiis adstrictam” (Apologia pro declamatione matrimonii, LB 108 E). “Nam tracto
dialectical reasoning, not doctrinal assertions, Erasmus stresses that the 
Encomium matrimonii should be read in combination with its altera 
pars, the suasoria against marriage, included in De conscribendis epis­
tolis?5 It is significant that, in the 1519 Apologia, Erasmus stresses how 
useful the exercise in dialectical reasoning is, as exemplified by his sua­
soriae for and against marriage, in that it contributes to eloquentia.36 
Echoing his own pedagogical principles, he thus stresses the role of 
rhetoric in moral education, aimed at teaching people to reflect on and to 
discuss important issues, and thus to make the right moral choices in 
their own lives. In short, the argument which Erasmus develops in his 
apologies is that it is inappropriate, given the dialectical character of the 
Encomium matrimonii, to judge it by the standards of theology, that is, 
by the standards which apply when one formulates or propagates the 
already established truths of faith and doctrine (as for instance in a ser­
mon).37
In the context of this argument, Erasmus makes his second point, 
namely that a rhetor, when writing a declamation, “thereby deliberately 
takes away credit from himself” (i.e. he makes it clear that he is arguing 
a case, not proclaiming the absolute truth, as would be required in a the­
ological treatise), and that the only thing at stake is his talent.38 This 
remarkable statement does by no means imply that an orator or a philoso­
pher may tell lies, say insincere and unbelievable things, or, in the case of 
the earnest Christian orator, may say things which go against established 
Christian truths. First, it contains the correct observation that the argu-
quaestionem suasoriam circumstantiis implicitam” (Dilutio , ed. Telle, p.73; also p. 
75-76).
35 Apologia pro declamatione matrimonii, LB 108 C. “Si in priori parte nullum esset 
argumentum quod refelli posset, quid haberet quod diceret, is qui diversam declamaret?” 
(.Appendix de scriptis Jodoci Clithovei, LB IX, 813 B).
36 See quotation in note 33.
37 “Quis unquam audivit exempla grammaticorum, aut dialecticorum, qui artis prae­
ceptionem tradant, exigi ad Theologorum placita?” (Appendix de scriptis Jodoci 
Clithovei, LB IX, 812 F). “Infirmorum offendiculo mihi uisus sum satis occurrisse, quum 
praefatione testarer argumentum esse declamatorium, ad parandam dicendi facultatem 
paratum, non ad dogmata religionis Christianae (Dilutio, ed. Telle, p.70). “Iam fingat me 
declamatiunculam illam ad rigorem theologiae uoluisse corrigere, quis non reclamasset, 
inepte quid facis?” (Dilutio, ed. Telle, p. 71).
38 “Quisquis enim declamationem profitetur, ipse sibi fidem abrogat: ac de ingenio 
periclitari potest, de fide non potest” {Apologia pro declamatione matrimonii, LB IX, 108
E). “Quod si rhetoris est in veris causis non semper vera dicere, sed probabilia, modo 
faciant ad victoriam, multo iniquius est in ficto themate singula ad theologicum rigorem 
excutere. Qui declamationem profitetur, ipse sibi fidem abrogat, nec potest nisi de inge­
nio periclitari” (Appendix de scriptis Jodoci Clithovei, LB IX, 812 F - 813 A).
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ments in a rhetorical discourse must be judged in light of their mutual 
connection and in function of the concrete question under discussion. 
Thus, it was incorrect and unfair of Clichtove to refuse to see the section 
iucundum in the context of the entire suasoria and to deduce from it that 
the Encomium matrimonii incites to lasciviousness. Secondly, Erasmus 
responds here, once more, to the unjustified accusation that the 
Encomium matrimonii contains absolute assertions which oppose the 
teaching of the Church. Erasmus is not however hiding his real intentions 
behind the mask of oratory, as has often been claimed, but he is offering 
resistance to the desire of the professional theologians to silence those 
who advocated ecclesiastical and theological reform, by appealing unnec­
essarily to the dogmas and the authority of the Church. In the apologies, 
he criticizes this desire by pointing out that it is at variance with the 
scholastic tradition itself. For within the context of academic exercises in 
disputation, as Erasmus observes, there exists a tradition of very lively 
debate pro and con theological topics in a dialectical setting. In these 
debates, he says, it is common to debate even doctrinal issues and to 
defend views which go against the teaching of Rome, and yet the dogmas 
and Church authority are never invoked and the debater’s orthodoxy is 
never doubted.39 His point is that if it is permissible in theological dispu­
tationes to say controversial and heretical things because disputationes 
are only debates, then this must also be allowed in rhetorical exercises.40
39 Erasmus mentions the quodlibetical disputations, the vesperiae (Apologia pro decla­
matione matrimonii, LB IX, 107 C) and the obligatorium (Dilutio, ed. Telle, p. 73). See for 
the vesperiae and the obligatorium S. Clasen OFM, ‘Collectanea zum Studicn und 
Buchwesen des Mittelalters’, Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie, 42 (1960), 205; 43 
(1961), 271. In the Apologia pro declamatione matrimonii Erasmus mentions the example 
of reasoning pro and con the thesis that fornication is a mortal sin (LB IX, 108 D). In the 
Appendix de scriptis Jodoci Clithovei, he observes that theologians would protest if one 
were to attack Thomas Aquinas for defending the thesis that in the Eucharist, it would be 
better to represent the body of Christ by means of the flesh of cattle than by means of bread 
and wine, for the theologians would claim that Thomas also gave the arguments against this 
thesis (LB IX, 813 B). He makes a similar point in th& Dilutio, quoting two examples from 
Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus (Dilutio, ed. Telle, p. 74). In the Apologia of 1519, 
Erasmus also observes that a malicious reader could find heretical statements in virtually 
every Christian author from ancient to modem times, such as Cyprian, Hilarius, Jerome, 
Ambrose, Augustine, Scotus, Aquinas, Peter of Lombard and Gerson (LB IX, 110 EF).
40 “Qui inter theologos proferunt Aristotelis placita ex diametro pugnantia cum ’doct­
rina Christi, sat habent dicere, loquor ut philosophus” (Appendix de scriptis Jodoci 
Clithovei, LB IX, 812 F). “In concertationibus scholasticis etiamsi quid dicitur repugnans 
catholicae ueritati, satis est dicere, Nunc loquor ut philosophus: et mihi nihil proderit 
vociferanti, Loquor ut rhetor, nec formo mores, sed instruo linguam” (Dilutio, ed. Telle, 
P-71).
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For rhetoric, like dialectic, deals with probable things, not with estab­
lished truths; moreover, declamations focus on questions taken from 
everyday life, not on abstract questions or theological doctrines.41
It must be stressed that Erasmus’s objection to his opponents’ rigidity 
does not mean that he himself was a sceptic with regard to dogma and 
Church authority. To the contrary, when Luther accused Erasmus of 
scepticism in the context of their argument about Free Will, Erasmus 
responded with a clear statement of loyalty to the Church and its teach­
ing.42 In his conflicts with Catholic theologians Erasmus also formulated 
his full allegiance to the truths of the faith, both those which are revealed 
directly by Scriptural authority and those which have been agreed to by 
the consensus of theologians and hence formulated as dogmas by the 
authority of the Church. According to Erasmus, these truths, such as the 
divine and human nature of Christ or the immortality of the soul, must 
never be a subject of debate, since that would bring them into the 
domain of things about which we have no certain knowledge.43 But
41 “Atque id faciunt (i.e., the theologians argue pro and con) in opere serio, cum ego 
declamationem duntaxat polliceor” (Apologia pro declamatione matrimonii, LB IX, 108 
D). “Hoc si valet (i.e., that one must listen to the arguments both pro and con) in dispu­
tatione theologica, quanto magis valere debet in ficto themate, in quo declamator neutram 
partem praestare cogitur” (Appendix de scriptis Jodoci Clithovei, LB IX, 813 C). In the 
Apologia pro declamatione matrimonii, Erasmus points out that Peter of Lombard 
strongly supports the argument for the propagation of the race in his Sententiae, that is, a 
doctrinal work, whereas he only presents one particular case in which marriage is argued 
as necessary (LB IX, 108 F - 109 A).
42 Hyperaspistes, book 1 (LB X, 1262 AB); this passage constitutes a response to 
Luther’s attack on a passage in De libero arbitrio, in which Erasmus states that his 
approach to theological problems is unauthoritarian and that he prefers to abstain from 
pronouncing a definitive statement wherever the authority of Scripture and the doctrine of 
the Church permits it (LB IX, 1215 D). See on these passages Chr. Christ-v. Wedel, Das 
Nichtwissen bei Erasmus von Rotterdam: zum philosophischen und theologischen 
Erkennen in der geistigen Entwicklung eines christlichen Humanisten (Basel - Frankfurt 
a. M., 1981), pp. 108-111. In the Detectio praestigiarum (1526), which forms part of the 
polemic on the Last Supper, Erasmus gives a definition of three different kinds of dog­
mata or theological doctrines; he submits unconditionally to only one kind, namely those 
doctrines which are formulated literally in Scripture and in the Symbol of the Apostles 
and the decisions made in Church councils properly called together and conducted (ASD 
IX-1, ed. C. Augustijn, p. 256, line 575-258, line 605).
43 See, e.g., the introduction of the 1519 annotation of 1 Corinthians 7, 39 (LB VI, 692
F). The introductory words to this note must be read in conjuction with Allen, no. 1006, 
lines 165 ff. (vol. 4, p. 47 ff.), a letter to Hoogstraten in which Erasmus responds to the 
former’s attack of Erasmus’s view on divorce as explained in his 1516 annotation of 
Matthew 19, 8. The point Erasmus makes in 1519 is that his note must not be read as a 
statement on the official teaching concerning marriage, but as an explanation of the 
Scriptural passage with regard to his concern with moral practice (see below, note 45).
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Erasmus felt that it was permitted to debate, within the limits set by doc­
trine, questions concerning marriage and celibacy in civil life, because 
they are not the object of such absolute consensus within the ecclesiasti­
cal tradition.44
The controversy between Erasmus and the professional theologians 
seems in many cases to have stemmed from the fact that Erasmus 
refused to approach problems from an authoritarian point of view by 
looking at the general dogma only, but chose to approach problems from 
the point of view of the practice of Christian life, that is, the individual 
effort which every Christian must undertake to live according to the 
adhortations of the Gospel. As a theologian, an orator and an educator, 
Erasmus saw it as his lifelong duty to counsel his readers in support of 
this effort.45 It is for this reason that he wrote declamations such as the 
suasoriae pro and con marriage, both in his early and mature age, and it 
is also for this reason that in 1532, he still defended his Encomium mat­
rimonii, composed some thirty years earlier as a youthful exercise in 
rhetoric, with the same confidence and candor that had characterized the 
Encomium itself.
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44 In the 1519 annotation of 1 Corinthians 7, 39 (LB VI, 693A-703D) Erasmus shows 
how divergent the opinions concerning marriage, divorce and celibacy have always been 
among the Church Fathers and scholastic theologians.
45 See, e.g., the introductory remark of the 1519 annotation on 1 Corinthians 7, 39: 
“Et ut fas non est, divinam Scripturam, quam certissimam habemus vitae regulam, abrog­
are, ita pii ac prudentis dispensatoris est, eam ad publicos mores accommodare” (LB VI, 
692 F - 693 A), and Erasmus’s remarks in a letter from 1521 to Peter Barbirius: “Ab 
asseueratione tempero, monitor esse malens quam dogmatistes” (Allen, no. 1225, vol. 4, 
p. 561, lines 231-232).
